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"construction of the statute" view coverage in the light of public policy.
Instead of viewing the third party strictly as a subrogee to the rights of
the assured, and therefor disallowing his claim against the insurer,2 5
they attribute to him rights independent of the assured, in effect treating him as a third-party-beneficiary. 26
On the other hand, courts which follow the second approach, estoppel by judgment, rather than basing their decisions on the actual terms
of the policy, are under no necessity of rationalizing their judgment for
the third party in terms of third-party-beneficiary or analogous concepts,
and in fact do reject any such theory. North Carolina 2" is one of this
majority of courts 28 which utilizes the estoppel by judgment approach
and rejects any suggestion that the third party has any greater rights
than the assured.
Automobile liability insurance is coming to be thought of more as a
social device for the reparation of injuries sustained than as a business
contract to be strictly construed for the protection of the assured. It
would appear that until liability insurance is required by law for all
drivers, the judicial attitude will seek to find coverage of intentional injuries in the policy itself, or estoppel to deny that coverage.
CLYDE T. RoLLINS.

Labor Law-Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949Suits for Unpaid Wages
A fundamental objective of the Fair Labor Standards Act' is to
secure for workers the wages which they are required to be paid. In
October, 1949, a new enforcement provision designed to further this
objective was added to the Act. This is Section 16(c), 2 which gives to
the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division the authority to

" See 8 APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 189-196 (1942).
2 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F. 2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943) ;

Franklin

v. Georgia Cas. Co., 225 Ala. 58, 141 So. 702 (1932) ; Indemnity Co. v. Bollas, 223
Ala. 239, 135 So. 174 (1931) ; Antichi v. New York Indemnity Co., 126 Cal. App.
284, 14 P. 2d 598 (1932) ; Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N. H.

40, 57 A. 2d 151 (1948).

See 8

APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE

196

(1942).
"7 State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. James, 80 F. 2d 802 (4th Cir. 1936)
MacClure v. Cas. Co., 229 N. C. 305, 49 S. E. 2d 742 (1948) ; Sears v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 220 N. C. 9, 16 S. E. 2d 419 (1941); Peeler v. Cas. Co., 197 N. C. 286,
148 S. E. 261 (1929).
"Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F. 2d 793 (4th Cir.
1950); Summers v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 109 F. 2d 845 (8th Cir. 1940); Clements
v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 41 F. 2d 470 (8th Cir. 1930); Royal Indemnity Co.
v. Morris, 37 F. 2d 90 (9th Cir. 1930) ; Guerin v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 107 Conn.
649, 142 Atl. 268 (1928); Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N. Y. 271,
160 N. E. 367 (1928). See 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 189-191

(1942).

'52 STAr. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. (1946), as amended, 63 STAT.
910, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. (Supp. 1949).
263 STAT. 919, 29 U. S. C. §216(c) (Supp. 1949).
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supervise payment of employees' claims for unpaid minimum wages and
unpaid overtime compensation. And, under this section, the Administrator, with the written consent of the employee-claimant, may bring
suit to recover the amount of such claim, provided, "that this authority
to sue shall not be used by the Administrator in any case involving an
issue of law which has not been settled finally by the courts. .. ."
Prior to the enactment of this amendment there were three instruments of enforcement available for use against recalcitrant employers.
(1) Section 16(b) 3 gives to the employee the right to sue for unpaid
wages and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, plus a
reasonable attorney's fee. (2) Section 174. provides that the Administrator can get an injunction against employers found to be in violation
of the Act. (3) Under Section 16(a)15 the Administrator can obtain
fines and jail sentences for willful violators on a second offense. Section 16(c) adds a fourth procedure to this already impressive array of
sanctions.
As a matter of administrative practice the Wage and Hour Division
had usually requested employers to make voluntary restitution of unpaid
wages to employees. But this met with only partial compliance for
two reasons: (A) even if the employer voluntarily paid the wages due,
he was still subject to suit for the liquidated damages under 16(b);
(B) some employers chose to gamble that they might not be sued at
all-past experience had shown that many employees were reluctant to
secure an attorney and bring suit, so the employer simply sat tight,
gambling that employee inertia would persist long enough for the statute
6
of limitations to run on the claim.
Because employers were not making restitution voluntarily and because the Administrator was often powerless to require payment, the
Department of Labor favored the adoption of 16(c), giving the Ad7
ministrator authority to bring suit if requested by the employee to do so.
In some situations, however, the Administrator was in position to
require restitution. In 1948 the Supreme Court handed down its deci152 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §216(b) (1946).
'52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §217 (1946), as amended, 63 STAT. 919, 29
U. S. C. §217 (Supp. 1949).
152 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §216(a) (1946).
'At the hearings, Mr. William R. McComb, Administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division, said: "The employer has found in many instances, I think, that
his employees will not sue him, and he has refused to pay voluntarily. We have
had a remarkable drop. We used to have voluntary payments from about 90 per-

cent of those we found in violation. They are now down to 30 percent. The em-

ployer just does not pay. He knows the employee probably will not sue him."
Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on H. R. 2033, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 115 (1949).
7Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on H. R. 2033, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1949). Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 653, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1949).
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8

sion in McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co. In this case the Administrator instituted a civil contempt proceeding, alleging violations of a
prior (1940) district court decree which enjoined the Paper Company
from violating the minimum wage, overtime, and record-keeping provisions of the Act. In this proceeding the Administrator asked that the
Company be required to make payment of unpaid statutory wages to employees affected. The Supreme Court held that the district court had
the power to order the Company, in order to purge their contempt, to
pay to the affected employees amounts of wages which were unpaid in
violation of the Act.9
In the Jacksonville case the Court said, "We can lay to one side the
question whether the Administrator, when suing to restrain violations of
the Act, is entitled to a decree of restitution for unpaid wages."' 0
The Court did not have that problem before it; it was dealing there
with the power of the court to enforce compliance with its injunction.
But the question which the Court "laid to one side" in the Jacksonville
case was raised almost at once in McComb v. Frank Scerbo & Sons.11
In this case the Administrator sought an injunction and, as ancillary
relief, a contemporaneous order compelling the employer to pay unpaid
overtime wages to employees affected. The court of appeals held that
the order compelling payment was proper, citing the Jacksonville case
12
as authority.
The Administrator's victory was short-lived. Congress promptly
negatived the effect of the Scerbo case by inserting the following proviso
into Section 17: no court shall have jurisdiction, in any action brought
by the Administrator to restrain such violations, to order the payment
to employees of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or an additionalequal amount as liquidated danmages in such action.
This restricts the holding in the Jacksonville case to the precise situation there dealt with. That is, the Administrator can get an order requiring payment of wages only in contempt proceedings for enforcement
of injunctions issued under section 17 for violations occurring subsequent to the issuance of such injunctions. 13
Because existing wage collection machinery has proved ineffectual
in many instances, Section 16(c), which gives the Administrator authority to bring suit for unpaid wages, was proposed. The Department of
Labor and the unions supported its adoption, but many witnesses at
8336 U. S. 187 (1948).
9
McComb v. Crane, 174 F. 2d 646 (5th Cir. 1949).
0 336 U. S. 187, 193 (1948).
"177 F. 2d 137 (2d Cir. 1949).
12 The court said that the fact that the Supreme Court in the Jacksonville case
had expressly left open the question whether the Administrator could obtain an
order compelling restitution as ancillary to injunctive relief appeared to be "judicial caution, not the discovery of a vital difference." Id. at 139.
1" H. R. REP. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1949).
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the hearings vigorously opposed it.
Without expressing the obvious
objection that this power in the hands of the Administrator would be
another club to hold over the head of the employer, many witnesses
opposed the amendment as an improper enlargement of government
action. 15 But, administrative authority to bring suit on behalf of a
private claimant is no innovation in this country. 16 Many states have
had similar provisions for a number of years, 17 and indeed in some states
the mere existence of the authority to bring suit has been such an effective 'deterrent to violators that the power has seldom been resorted to.
But 16(c) as finally adopted was not in reality the amendment proposed by the Administrator, though both the House and the Senate
Committees reported out the section substantially as he had proposed
it.18 In conference the section was saddled with a proviso which restricts the Administrator's authority to bring a suit for an employee to
cases where the law has been settled finally by the courts.' 9 The pro"The witnesses invariably represented the views of management. Hearings

on H. R. 2033, supra note 7, at 226, 460, 582, 595, 954, 983, 1054, 1268, 1340, 1431,
1707.
" Mr. Peter T. Beardsley, Attorney, American Trucking Associations, had this
to say: ". . . We fail to comprehend any legitimate reason why any government
officer, no matter what his status, should be empowered to provide free legal services to a selected category of private litigants, at the expense of the general taxpayer." Hearings on H. R. 2033, supra note 7, at 595.
"0Instances of such authority were not unknown in federal legislation. 49 STAT.
2037 (1936), 41 U. S. C. §36 (1946) (Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act).
"' Strongest of the state statutes is that of Rhode Island which makes it the
"duty" of the director of the Dep't of Labor to institute actions for collection of
wages. R. I. Pub. Laws, 1941, c. 1069, §6(a).
In Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Oregon, New York, and Utah,
the appropriate administrative officer may, upon assignment of the wage claim to
him, bring "any legal action necessary to collect such claim." Wisconsin limits
this authority to claims of less than $100. ALASKA ComP. LAws ANN. §43-1-5(4)
(1949); CONN. GEN. STAT. §3796 (1949); HAWAII REv. LAws §4363 (1945);
MAss. ANN. LAWS C. 151, §20 (Supp. 1948); N. Y. LABOR LAW §199(2); ORE.
CoI'. LAWs ANN. §102-613(b) (1940) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §49-9-22 (1943) ; Wis.
STAT. §101.10(14) (1947).
In California, Illinois, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania, the appropriate administrative officer may bring suit to collect unpaid wages owing to women and minors. CAL. LABOR CODE §1195.5 (1943) ; ILL.
ANN. STAT. c. 48, §198.16 (Cum. Supp. 1948); Ky. REv. STAT. §337.360 (1948);
N. H. REv. LAws c. 213, §23 (1942) ; N. J.STAT. ANN. §34:11-56 (1940) ; OHIO
GEN. CODE ANN. §154-45s (1946); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §331(o) (1941).
In Arkansas, California, Nevada, and Washington, suit may be brought to
collect wages of persons who are financially unable to employ counsel. ARK. STAT.
§81-312 (1947); CAL. LABOR CODE §98 (1943); NEv. ComP. LAws ANN. §2751
(Supp. 1941); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. §7596-1 (Supp. 1940).
New Mexico's statute gives the labor commissioner authority to sue for collection of wage claims When, in his judgment, the claimant is "entitled to the services
of the commissioner." N. M. STAT. ANN. §57-312 (1941).
And the South Carolina statute simply says that the labor commissioner shall
"cooperate' with any employee in the enforcement of his wage claim. The statute
does not seem broad enough to include authority to bring suit. S. C. CODE ANN.
§7034-6(6) (1942).
11 H. R. REP. No. 267, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1949); SEN. REP. No. 640.
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
"H. R. RE. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1949).
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viso was designed to prevent the Administrator from using his authority
to bring test cases involving new or novel questions of law.2 0 But the
difficulties which the proviso injects are at once obvious. The phrasing
of it supplies to ingenious defendants incentive to obscure the principal
issue with a smoke screen of preliminary questions as to whether the
case does, or does not, involve an issue of law which has been settled
finally by the courts. Does the proviso mean that the Supreme Court
must have ruled on the question? Or is it sufficient that certiorari has
been denied? Or is it enough that one of the courts of appeals has
ruled on the point? And what if there is disagreement among the
circuits ?2o4
Employee suits will continue to be an important instrument for collection of wages, 2 ' and the Jacksonville case still provides a means for
the Administrator to act as a collecting agent in a limited number of
situations. Section 16(c), inasmuch as it provides that when an employee accepts payment under the Administrator's supervision or consents to an action on his behalf by the Administrator, he waives his right
of action under 16(b) to sue for liquidated damages, should stimulate
voluntary payments by fair-minded employers who formerly did not
make payment voluntarily because they feared that a subsequent suit
for liquidated damages might be brought. But 16(c) may prove not to
be the panacea which the Administrator originally envisioned. The
full efficacy of the section, in view of the proviso limiting the authority
of the Administrator to bring suit to those cases in which the law has
been settled with finality, will depend upon a determination of what
the proviso really means. It is significant that though half the states
22
have somewhat similar statutes none of these is similarly restricted.
JAmEs L. TAPLEY.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application to Airplane Accidents
Decedent, who also held a pilot's license, was permitted by the pilot
to ride in a dual control airplane which was to execute "precision spins"
as part of a demonstration of airplane maneuvers. The pilot was in the
instructor's seat when the plane took off, decedent being seated in the
rear seat. The plane, once aloft, began the maneuver, but instead of
pulling out of the spin and resuming level flight, it continued its downward movement until it crashed on the ground, killing both occupants.
In a suit brought by decedent's administrator to recover for wrongful
20 Id. at 32.
." See note, 63 HARv. L. R. 1078 (1950), which appeared after this note was in
proof.
2'The
Division can inspect each year less than 5% of the establishments now
covered by the Act. Hearings on S. 653, supra note 7, at 74.
" See note 17 supra.

